Since the late 1970s detailed reconstruction of Darwin's metaphysical stance in the period surrounding the formulation of his evolutionary theory has flourished. 12 One assumption of this scholarship has been that the public ambiguity of the Origin in 1859 might be resolved by the private candor of the metaphysical enquiries of 1837 to 1839. The most intense work in this vein has tended to overthrow the 'cryptic coloration' view of Darwin's ambiguous God-talk. The leaders of this revision are Ospovat, Gillespie, Moore, 13 and Brooke. 14 Earlier studies based on Notebooks B-E alone had already shown that natural theology was essential (or to use Ospovat's later term 'constitutive') to the formulation of Darwin's theory. 15 However, from the studies based on Notebooks B-E and M-N a new Darwin emerged, portrayed not as the founder of secular humanism, but as the last of the natural theologians. 16 However, the revision was not universal. The same materials, when studied in the same period, by Schweber, Manier So we continue to have these conflicting portraits: Darwin as conforming Victorian theist-the last of the natural theologians-and Darwin as religious radical who recovered the deistic tradition of the enlightenment and had a special role in establishing the independence of scientific naturalism and the secularization of the modern world view. So far the 'theists' have had the last word and the 'secularists' have not chosen to respond. But there are grounds here for a debate, which I hope my paper will help catalyse. Before embarking, I would stress my intuition that important issues are at stake in this debate. At stake is the proper use of constructivist historiography of science. At stake, as well, is the proper use of history in shaping current relations between science and culture.
Proponents of the 'Darwin as theist' school often adhere to the constructivist approach to the history of science. In this instance that means they are drawn to study Darwin's metaphysics to show that Darwin's science is socially constructed. I would like to clarify my position on this issue. Personally, I admit to great identification with the constructivist view that elements of natural theology, and the strongly linked elements of classical political economy, are constitutive and regulative to the formation of Darwin's science. I think the constructivist approach has been amply confirmed in Darwin's case by almost every serious student of the subject. 20 If any science was socially constructed it was Darwin's.
However, I do have a problem with the way the evidence for social construction has been used. The argument has been made as follows: We perceive a theistic frame underlying Darwin's most fundamental scientific theories. The early Victorian period was profoundly religious. The rational religion of the 1790s is closely integrated with the defence of the new economic order brought on by the British industrial revolution. Likewise the reform of natural theology in the 1830s is linked with the political reforms that consolidated power relations in the expansive industrial social order. Therefore, Darwin's science is appropriate to his context. Therefore, his science was socially constructed.
In this reading the social construction has seemed to hinge on making Darwin out to be a theist. 21 The problem is that the social construction of Darwin's science is not that simple. This is for two basic reasons. Certainly, Darwin was a member of the reformist elite whose general interests lay with the renewal and reinforcement of rational religion, rational science, and rational state. But we should bear in mind that in the 1830s this nexus of interests was not a monolithic force. For one thing, rational religion was in severe crisis. It may have had broad appeal to the scientific elite. But in the wider religious culture it was caught in the vice of the anti-Erastian and anti-modern Oxford movement and the revelational theology of evangelicalism. While Marian Evans' translations of German biblical criticism were being ignored, the tractarians were successfully introducing the study of patristics from Europe and the evangelicals were successfully appropriating technology to spread the Bible and its literal interpretation abroad.
If we try to sight the cultural domain newly called 'science' along an angle of vision that encompasses evangelicals and tractarians, one can be challenged to see the Bridgewater Treatises, Whewell's reform of natural theology, the religious apology of the early British Association, 22 and Baden Powell's liberal theology 23 as rather disorganized rearguard actions. We can discern some exponents of that rearguard advancing through relatively conservative reforms of natural theology. 24 But we can also see that other exponents of reformed natural theology seem forced to move to ever more attenuated and enlightened high ground to maintain the old ties of religion, science, and political economy. 25 From this angle, one can interpret the private notebooks of Charles Darwin as an extreme expression of that 'advanced' wing of the reform movement. 26 However, when one senses the frustration of the reformed natural theology, given the religious strains of the day, one sees Darwin's utter transformation of natural theology as a product of the licence that frustration bred.
The social construction of Darwin's science is not simple for a second reason. Side by side with natural theology, Darwin also expresses a profound attraction for materialism and even experiences the siren call of seditious atheism. These ideas underlay Darwin's most fundamental early theories and are cultural resources no less constitutive than those drawn from natural theology. The presence of these elements in Darwin's thought suggests that profound secularizing tendencies operated beneath the surface of early Victorian culture and came to bear on Darwin's science. In Darwin's case one obvious route of access to these resources is the joint family traditions of radical deism and Unitarian non-conformity that trace to the generation of Erasmus Darwin and Josiah Wedgwood. By the 1830s atheistic free-thought is a pariah tradition among gentlemen of Darwin's class. As Adrian Desmond shows, atheism, materialism, and Lamarckism had their audience among radical artisans. 27 This is an interesting cultural reversal: the repressed causes of the Enlightenment elite are kept alive by radical elements of the industrial artisanry. These revolutionary causes were not likely to find an open champion in Charles Darwin. However, they were a part of his patrimony, literally handed down in the male line of the Wedgwood-Darwins. A sanitized materialism appeals to Darwin and appears to him an acceptable option so long as its metaphysical consequences are not expressed. Just how widely diffused such residual enlightenment sentiments were among Darwin's class and colleagues requires further study, as does their contribution to scientific naturalism as an elite movement seeking a new secular nexus of science and state relatively independent of religion. In Darwin's case the family residuum of materialism and deism fueled his extreme reform of natural theology. Thus it had a major impact on both his scientific and metaphysical formation. Unfortunately, this dimension of Darwin's context has been suppressed or dismissed by those who have reconstructed Darwin as the last of the natural theologians. But a constructivist stance does not preclude, indeed must include, a sensitivity to the polythetism of early Victorian intellectual life. We cannot arrive at a genuine social construction of Darwin unless we take Darwin's materialism and its subversive influence on his natural theology into account. Thus, we cannot and ought not to accept either of the two Darwins that scholars have portrayed and opposing apologetic camps have appropriated. The Darwin of the notebooks is not a religious scientist in the sense of an Adam Sedgwick. Rather, he is a scientific theorist with a conflicted religious family background and training, who is operating in a complex religious, scientific, and political setting, and who is struggling with the metaphysical consequences of his scientific theory. As we examine that struggle we find Darwin, rather early, came to a stable but inherently ambiguous resolution of conflicting metaphysical impulses. While there were many trying technical obstacles which separate the bold evolutionary vision of the late 1830s from the Origin as published, 28 1 hope to show that the road from the metaphysical resolution of the late 1830s to the Origin is more straightforward than some (notably Ospovat) have suggested. Indeed, that resolution is both present in the last notebooks and reflected in the Origin, where we find a Darwin who is both a kind of theist and a radical secularist, both a manipulator of religious sentiment and a devastating critic of consensual Christian theology.
Thus profoundly non-Providential. 30 Therefore, his reform facilitates the coming realignment of cognitive authority and cultural power. It is just because there is and there is not an antithesis between Paley and Darwin that he is so potent for the coming shift to the secular alliance of science and state. Darwin opens the door for a non-theological naturalism that yet retains a teleological ethos. This is a genuine secularization: it unslips the scholastic knot of God and purpose by translating the self-evident Christian myth of purpose into the self-evident scientific myth of evolving function. Thus it secularizes, and captures without loss of potency, the core ideological justification of capitalism: what works in nature works in society. By translating purpose into natural process, ideological grounds are given for a new alliance of science and state to the diminution of religion. Thus, those who see Darwin as the last of the natural theologians are so justly impressed with his debt to theology that they have failed to come to grips with the depth of his revision of teleology, his concomitant secularization of natural theology, and the meaning of evolutionary naturalism for the integration of science in industrial society.
On the other hand, we need to avoid a serious trap. Darwin's new secular utilitarianism, while it opened the 'explanatory range' of natural history for later generations of what George Levine calls 'a materialist science', 31 was intended to reform rather than destroy theological tradition. Darwin very obviously is a liberal reformer rather than a free-thought radical. Indeed, Darwin's theory has vastly more radical religious implications than Darwin the comfortable scion of the newly conforming, arriviste gentry could accommodate.
32 But today's spokespersons for the humanities and evolution, such as the literary critic George Levine and the historian William Provine, who would legitimately perpetuate the tradition of Darwin as a founder of secular humanism yet who would reduce the contradictions of Darwin's religious location to 'effective atheism' 33 are recreating Darwin in their own image. Because this is poor history, it is also bad humanist strategy. Contemporary science cannot afford to obfuscate its history just when contemporary evangelicals, not to mention liberal Christian and post-confessional apologists, show signs of sophistication in interpreting the history of science for their diverse aims. From my perspective, it is vital that all sides own up to the full complexity of Darwin's metaphysical situation and the creative contradictions of its role in the social production of his theory. Constructivist historiography when applied to the 'whole Darwin' does not leave us with an unrecognizable theistic Darwin or a too familiar atheistic Darwin. Rather it should force us to see ourselves in a new light. If Darwin's passage to evolutionary secularism was difficult and incomplete, we should see that our own incom- I would like to introduce a new interpretation of Darwin's path to natural selection that envisions a dialectic relationship between his growing scientific theory and his conflicting metaphysical allegiances. This interpretation places the basic theory-making episodes I have proposed in the past within a larger structure. 34 More importantly, this interpretation explains the narrative connection of Darwin's episodes and it takes account of the 'whole' metaphysical Darwin. It couples his expanding scientific vision to his shifting understanding of the metaphysical implications of that vision. In the transformations of Darwin's theory produced by this dialectic, the relationship between metaphysics and natural history is reciprocal, mutually constructive, and regulated by Darwin's perception of audience, which I identify with social location.
For the sake of brevity I take the heterogeneous influence on the young Darwin as given. 37 I gratefully acknowledge Pietro Corsi who suggested this hypothesis to me in conversation in 1982. However, I have been reluctant to accept this hypothesis without manuscript evidence. But there is direct evidence in Darwin's Red Notebook (RN 32) that Herschel spoke to him about the geological contents of his letter. (Op. cit. 12, Charles Darwin's Notebooks, Red Notebook, n. 32-1.) As the letter had already been circulated in London, there seems little grounds for presuming that Herschel did not also speak of its metaphysical contents with Darwin. If he did so, then Darwin's speculations take on new meaning. For then Darwin's first questioning of the stability of species occurred just after he learned the metaphysical implications of a naturalistic explanation of species from Herschel. Then they reveal a Darwin in search of secondary laws that would solve the mystery of mysteries. From this perspective, it matters little whether Darwin was converted to transmutation by his early speculations or not. What matters is that Darwin's search for a scientific theory of biological origins is taken up in a precise theological context. That context is framed by the Herschelian outlook. What matters is that the scientific problematic of the origin of species is already set on the Beagle. It is not set by Paley, but by the agenda of the liberal reformers of natural theology. That Herschelian agenda is very similar to the theological high road we find in the Transmutation Notebooks and in the Origin. This points to a major continuity in Darwin's thinking. God operates by natural laws. Science must be free to embrace the sceptical ethos of scientific naturalism. Theology must be rigorously neutral about the content of scientific discoveries. But those discoveries induce to higher laws, which point to a natural order and thence to a lawful Deity.
After his return to England, the stability of species came under Darwin's critical scrutiny as his new scientific colleagues examined his South American and Galapagean specimens. 38 A little more than a year after his encounter with Herschel, Darwin opened his first notebook on transmutation. By then, July 1837, Darwin was a convinced transformist in search of an explanatory mechanism. In its opening pages, Darwin set out the fundamental problem of his theory. How do species acquire hereditary adaptations to this ever-altering world? This problem Darwin synthesized out of the failed naturalism of Paley and Lyell. Paley made evidence of adaptation the direct evidence of Provident design. Lyell made the gradual but inevitable rhythm of geological change the overarching condition of organic existence, but, denying transmutation, he failed to explain how species adapt. Again the metaphysical reform is at the heart of the scientific problem. But Darwin's first answers to this problem are not drawn from natural theology. Rather his resources are opposing deistic traditions of the enlightenment. It is not the utility or teleology of adaptations that engages Darwin, though their 'perfection' is assumed. Rather, his answers are grounded in speculative physiology: first in the physiology of reproduction and then in the equally physiological inheritance of instinct. 39 Much of Darwin's search for a naturalistic law in Notebooks B, C, and D is dominated by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. It is a Lamarckian ball played on a Lyellian field in a game Darwin was determined to play by Herschelian rules. At first it was the laws of reproductive variation that guaranteed hereditary adaptive change. Then this general principle, which is repeated insistently, is subsumed in Darwin's explanation of behaviour.
40 These principles were naturalistic but they were also materialistic. some physiological mechanism-some process intrinsic to the stuff of life and the stuff of brain-that allowed organic matter to acquire adaptive change. In a word, he assumed that Lamarckian materialism would provide a natural law to explain the mystery of mysteries. The frame remained Herschelian. 41 However, the metaphysical implications of Darwin's theory-be they deistic or atheistic-went so far beyond Herschel's critique of Lyell that they threatened the theistic assumptions of Herschel's reform. 42 This threat came only gradually into clear focus for Darwin over the Spring and Summer of 1838 in transmutation Notebook C and in a new notebook marked 'Private' and devoted to 'metaphysical enquiries'. 43 In the latter, Darwin's Notebook M, he wrote 'To avoid stating how far, I believe, in Materialism, say only that emotions, instincts degrees of talent, which are hereditary are so because brain of child resembles parent stock.-' This injunction cautiously to hide the metaphysical conclusions to be drawn from his then forming theory of evolution, marks a telling episode in that historical relationship between Christianity and modern thought which Owen Chadwick defines as secularization. 44 If one basic process of secularization is the translation of theologically grounded concepts, then another process of secularization is silence.
It is evident that Darwin's evolutionary materialism not only drove him to include Man in the compass of evolution, but it led him to the view that the explanation of all behaviour (including all the 'higher' human functions) will ultimately be reduced to biological explanations of the nervous system. Between the Julys of 1837 and 1838 he had studied physiological literature that treats materialism. If one reads his marginalia on Miiller 45 and on Abercrombie 46 and Barclay, 47 it is clear that he sided with the materialists and was wary of its implications. Indeed he became obsessed with the materialist formulation that mind is an epiphenomenal, derivative product of brain. More interestingly, he thinks through what would be the metaphysical consequences of such materialism. In March 1838 he wrote:
Thought being heredetary.-it is difficult to imagine it anything but structure of brain heredetary,... love of the deity effect of organization, oh you Materialist!-48 41 Given the Herschelian frame, we should not be surprised to find him grandly claiming the 'whole (of) metaphysics' as a domain for evolutionary explanation on a par with comparative anatomy (Notebook B, 228). Nor should we be surprised at Darwin's nasty jibes at the theological narrowness of creationism which begin in Notebook B and carry through to the Origin.
42 According to Herschel's rules of play, science could not lead to atheism 'No doubt, the testimony of natural reason .. . while it places the existence and principle attributes of a Deity on such grounds as to render doubt absurd and atheism ridiculous, it unquestionably opposes no natural or necessary obstacle to further progress. . .' (J.F.W. Herschel, Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, London, 1830, p. 7).
43 For the sake of brevity, I take as given the reality of that threat as witnessed in the tradition of political repression that linked materialism to atheism. Darwin's awareness of that tradition forms the background for the conceptual moves he made between March and September 1838. Thought is a secretion of brain. Even the idea and love of God, the essence of faith, is an 'effect of organization', a secretion of brain. It is not far from here to Darwin's position in the Descent of Man that the idea of God is a human projection, a manifestation of our anthropocentric arrogance. A few months later, in July 1838, Darwin made a geological field trip to Scotland after a year of intensive thought on the theory of transmutation. While studying the parallel roads of Glen Roy, he put his field observations and hasty sketches in a tiny notebook. As he worked, thoughts of his evolutionary theory did not entirely abandon him and we find a very few scraps of transformist speculation in this notebook. It is interesting that one such scrap was:'. . . brain makes thought'. Darwin's evolutionary materialism was very much with him at Glen Roy.
Darwin remained in Scotland but a few weeks, and instead of returning to London he proceeded to his family home in Shropshire. It was there, on July 15, that he simultaneously opened Notebook D-the notebook which in six weeks would be the locus for his Malthusian explanation of transmutation-and he established the new series of notebooks (Notebooks M and N) to cope with his burgeoning interest in Man, metaphysics and morals. More precisely, it was established to cope with his burgeoning interest in materialism. Now the plot thickens. After two weeks at home in Shrewsbury, he set out for London. But on the way he spent three days, 29-31 July 1838, in the home of his Uncle Josiah Wedgwood at Maer in Staffordshire. I have been able to determine, from the colour of the ink that he used, that Darwin wrote two very interesting comments in his parallel notebooks during those three days. In Notebook D he wrote:
In my speculation Must not go back to first stock of all animals ... for if so. it will be necessary to show how the first eye is formed.-how one nerve becomes sensitive to light.-This is a piece of metaphysical strategic advice. Darwin is saying, do not write about the specific 'origins' of things. 49 The reason for Darwin's caution is that origins imply creation. To discuss them, Darwin the materialist would have to posit physical mechanisms 'how one nerve becomes sensitive to light'. That would be both speculative and materialistic; hence controversial and revealing.
It is, however, revealing to the historian that over the same three days, Darwin wrote in Notebook M, the passage with which I began this section:
To avoid stating how far, I believe, in Materialism, say only that emotions, instincts degrees of talent, which are hereditary are so because brain of child resembles parent stock 50 Once again, in the same brief period at Maer, Darwin becomes cautious about revealing his materialism, and 'how far' he believes in it. That is, what implications he might draw from it.
Why does Darwin suddenly become metaphysically defensive and self-censoring? A few weeks earlier, tramping in the Highlands on his first return to 'nature' since the return of the Beagle, materialism was bubbling through his consciousness. Undoubtedly the 49 It is advice Darwin takes to heart. It has often been observed that for a book called the Orgin, there is a conspicuous avoidance of some kinds of origins. Here we see that avoidance is ancient and self-conscious.
50 Op. cit. 12, Charles Darwin's Notebooks, Notebook M 57.
answer is that Darwin was visiting with, and talking with, someone other than his uncle during those three days at Maer: namely, Darwin's cousin and future wife Emma Wedgwood. We know that the courtship of Charles and Emma began with that visit. We know that the couple had a long goose (i.e. chat) by the fire in Maer Hall library. We also know that shortly thereafter, Darwin's father advises Charles never to talk about religion with his wife. And we know that Emma was a pious woman, more precisely an Anglican evangelical woman. In fact Emma had long been concerned about the atheistical tendencies of her own father. 51 These anxieties now spread to include her cousin-suitor, who came from that dubious Darwin side of her family.
It
Indeed, she read a passage on the role of chance in the evolution of the eye and wrote in the margin 'a great assumption E. D.' Charles duly amended that passage with a few words about perfection.
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As Darwin became involved with Emma Wedgwood in 1838, his exploration of the metaphysical consequences of evolution became modulated, even conflicted. We can see this by returning to our narrative of materialism in the notebooks. Ten days after he left Emma for London, Darwin again wrote in a materialist vein:
. . . the free will (if so called) makes change in bodily organization of oyster, so may free will make change in man.-the real argument fixes on heredetary disposition &C instincts . . . The above views would make a man a predestinarian of a new kind, because he would tend to be an atheist. 52 We know that Emma's power as a censor and a source of internalized self-censorship was palpable enough to alter the construction of Darwin's texts. To me this means one crucial thing, not a word of the ambiguous God-talk in the Origin can be taken at face value. We know that some of what is there is indeed 'cryptic coloration' for Darwin's feelings and what is not there may be consciously omitted. We are left with an irresolvable ambiguity. Some of Darwin's God-talk is 'cryptic coloration', some is honest appeal for Darwin's higher notion of God. We must factor Emma in. Ironically, when we do that we only complicate matters. We cannot know the extent to which the position shaped by Darwin's internalized self-censorship became his sincere position; we cannot know the extent to which Darwin became convinced of the orthodoxy of his own position.
53 Op. cit. 12, Charles Darwin's Notebooks, Notebook M 72-74. This is not to say that Darwin definitively became an atheist at this point. But he was certainly concerned that this was one serious consequence of his views. There is some evidence which at first reading suggests he decided that he was not forced to so extreme a position:
thought, however unintelligible it may be, seems as much function of organ, as bile of liver.-Pis the attraction of carbon, hydrogen (&c) in certain definite proportions,... really less wonderful than thoughts-What is matter? the whole a mystery.-5 So far this is the simple physical materialism we have already seen. Then in a contemporaneous gloss on this passage he raises the question of metaphysical materialism. He adds a set of comments that I would parse into two statements:
(1) This Materialism does not extend to Atheism.
(2) inutility of so high a mind without further end just same argument.
Darwin's gloss requires careful interpretation. His first statement: 'This Materialism does not tend to Atheism.' should be read as irony; something like 'You want to tell me this Materialism does not tend to Atheism ?' I make this interpretation on the basis of the second statement: 'inutility of so high a mind without further end' is the sort of providentialist design argument that Darwin consistently rejected in the notebooks and in the Origin. 55 When he says 'inutility of so high a mind without further end just same argument' (my emphasis), he means that materialism not tending to atheism is the same sort of providentialist design argument as that the 'inutility of so high a mind' implies a 'further end'. The juxtaposition of the two statements requires us to read the 'not' in 'does not tend to Atheism' as irony. This interpretation is reinforced by Darwin's straightforward statement in M 74 (written 7-12 August 1838):
The above items would make a man a predestinarian of a new kind, because he would tend to be an atheist.
Darwin's materialism had at least a metaphysical dimension, but when he came once again to grapple with the metaphysics of evolution he now experienced a period of confusion, if not crisis, when atheism both attracted and frightened him. Darwin never says, 'I am an atheist'. It is more that he says, 'Surely, one who holds my views might well be an atheist.' That confused attraction for the dangerous metaphysical path envisioned but not quite taken is expressed in a strategy of private censorship and a tone of private irony that contribute to Darwin's later public ambiguity. Even if he did convince himself that having gone the whole Orang, he need not go the whole Abyss, nevertheless, he exercised due caution in expressing even his physical materialism. Given the circumstances of his age and situation, greater candor could have cost him both audience and wife. 56 Given this evidence, I do not think one can preclude the possibility that in the closet with his physical materialism, there remained the apprehension that the logic of his hereditarian theory of mind led 'all metaphysics' to materialist atheism. But here the textual trail of metaphysical materialism disappears. Given his self-censorship, we may not be able to trust anything he wrote on metaphysical subjects for publication. All we know is that we find Darwin wavering towards atheism and about to marry a very religious woman. All the rest on that score may be underground. This is Darwin less than two months before formulating natural selection. Here there are grounds for debate with those who interpret Darwin as the last of the natural theologians, and who have tended to ignore the extent, coherence, and significance of Darwin's engagement with materialism and atheism. For, in the following weeks, Darwin's metaphysical crisis was to have consequences for his scientific theory that scholars have not previously recognized. It is important to emphasize that Darwin's crisis of materialism appeared prior to and independent of natural selection. It is also important to remember the sequence in which metaphysics and scientific theory have alternated in our narrative so far. In the Beagle ornithological notes, the movement is from Herschel's metaphysical challenge to Darwin's scientific speculations. Then in the transmutation notebooks and Notebook M up to July 1838, the movement is from scientific theory to metaphysical consequence. There is a rhythm to this dialectic of metaphysics and emerging scientific theory. That constructive interplay also continues after July 1838 when Darwin finds materialism unacceptably dangerous. Then his Lamarckian scientific theory loses its appeal. 57 Once more it is the metaphysics that shapes the development of the scientific theory. He teeters on the edge of atheism and like so many Victorians withdraws from the abyss. In Darwin's case, this means he must recover the Herschelian high road and it means that Darwin becomes open to finding an entirely new mechanism of transformist explanation. He becomes open for the major intellectual shift in the development of his theory: the formulation of natural selection.
The apparently sudden emergence of natural selection has long been a 'mystery of mysteries' unto its own, appearing to have little connection to the prior mainstream of his theory making. In 1980, 58 for example, I gave no account of the precipitating circumstances beyond the critical reading of Malthus. We now can see that Darwin's metaphysically driven shift away from his 'intrinsic', physiological, materialist mechanism prepared the way for a new theory; one that was not overtly materialist. That theory was natural selection, which hinges first on the adaptive characteristics of organisms and only secondarily on the physiological basis of those characteristics. Now new metaphysical issues would be at stake. For with natural selection, teleology-not materialism-becomes the prime metaphysical issue.
Our last point of encounter is Darwin within one or two months after the first formulation of natural selection. Again he is exploring the metaphysical consequences of his theory. We find that his concern is indeed no longer materialism; instead he has returned to text books on natural theology: in part no doubt for examples of adaptation to be given a selectionist reworking; in part to put paid to the claim that his theory, once he had it, would explain 'all of metaphysics'. We find Darwin reading John Macculloch's 57 I am not suggesting that Darwin drops the theory of hereditary instinct. Rather, it loses its place as the central mechanism of transmutation. Instinct recedes to become a major domain for the application of evolutionary theory. The theory of hereditary instinct is later integrated into the theory of natural selection. Another way of expressing this is that hereditary behaviour moves from the domain of vera causa to the domain of consilience, from Part I of Darwin's theoretical structure to Part II (op. cit. 34). Although Richards (op. cit. 20) describes superbly the subsequent development of Darwin's work in this important area, again his psychocentrism leads him to distort its centrality; see n. 39. 58 Op. cit. 12, Kohn, 1980. recently published Proofs and illustrations of the attributes of God. 59 When Macculloch alludes to the significance of abortive organs, Darwin writes:
He explains it by saying 'It is the determination to adhere to a plan once adopted; & it's from these very circumstances, that we become satisfied respecting an original thought, or design, pursued to its utmost exhaustion, & till it must be abandoned for another' 60 Darwin seems to have become irate: 'What bosch!! Put it to case of man', he wrote, and:
The determination of a God-head.-the designs of an omnipotent creator, exhausted &c abandoned. Such is Man's philosophy when argues about his Creator! 61 In his new Malthusian mode, Darwin has a moment of clarification. He writes:
The Final cause of innumerable eggs is explained by Malthus.
Then he adds:
[is it anomaly in me to talk of Final causes: consider this!-consider these barren Virgins 62 Final causes are like barren virgins. This comes from Francis Bacon's Advancement of Science, but it comes to Darwin more probably from Whewell's Bridgewater treatise. 63 Sporadically in the Notebooks he had adopted uncritically the language of final causes along with the problematic of adaptation; he had used uncritically the language of providential design, even as he railed against special creation. However, the traditional language of teleology becomes particularly intense in September 1838 before he reads Malthus and tries to sort out the 'final cause' of separate sexes. Only after Malthus does he draw on Bacon who had relegated final causes to 'metaphysique'; and considered them barren for 'physique'. Whewell had tried to recoup the final cause for biology. Darwin can no longer find this acceptable. Hereafter he drops that teleological language which tends to point to a providential design. But Darwin's new teleology was to go beyond dropping final cause as an 'anomaly' of language. Natural selection brought with it a critical restructuring of natural theology. Simultaneous to the jettisoning of providentialist final cause came a new understanding of harmony in nature as the product of competitive struggle. 64 Simultaneously, he was also to transform the very meaning of adaptation. Indeed, the key conceptual shift produced by natural selection is identical to the theory's key secularization of biological meaning. Namely, the transition from perfect adaptation to relative adaptation.
Just how this shift occurred again offers grounds for debate. According to Ospovat's influential account, the earliest expression of relative adaptation did not occur until November 1854 65 and it only has its clearest expression in the Origin. 66 In his view, then, perfect adaptation, the essential unreconstructed element of the old natural theology, prevails in a new selectionist form in the 1842 Sketch and the 1844 Essay. Thus for Ospovat, natural theology constrains Darwin's understanding of natural selection and this accounts for the limited scope Darwin grants to his mechanism in those first expositions of his theory.
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It is quite true that a full-blown expository critique of providential teleology and with it a canonical definition of relative adaptation are only to be found in Chapter 6 of the Origin (Difficulties on Theory):
Natural selection tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slightly more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it has to struggle for existence.
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However, I would argue that Darwin sufficiently revised his understanding of adaptation already in Notebook E that the providentialist implications of the concept were faced and abandoned along with final cause and harmony, and thereafter relative adaptation is used as a working concept in Darwin's notes up to the writing of the Origin. This argument requires a clarification of the terms 'perfect' and 'relative' as well as a recalibration of the development of Darwin's theory after Malthus. I can begin to illustrate these points very simply with the curious observation that Darwin never used the term 'perfectly adapted' until after he read Malthus. Indeed he rarely modified the terms adapted and adaptation until after he conceived natural selection. That should not surprise us now that we understand that for the materialist Darwin of the Deus ex sexuale et mentale perfect adaptation or maybe just adaptation tout court just happened and was unproblematic. 69 The whole question of perfect versus relative adaptation only has relevance for the selectionist Darwin. Because natural selection is an inherently teleological/utilitarian concept, as Darwin tried to apply the concept the quality of adaptation required definition. In November 1838 he wrote:
(Species are innumerable variations). Every structure is capable of innumerable variations, as long as each shall be perfectly adapted to circumstances of times. 70 65 'At about the same time that perfect adaptation ceased to be a theoretically important assumption in Darwin's thought, he concluded that adaptation is relative. In discussing increasing and dying genera, Darwin argued that the inhabitants of two different continents are probably not equally well adapted and that if put into competition with each other the productions of one continent would probably "prevail considerably" over the other. ' It is in such passages that Ospovat reads Darwin's long continued belief in perfect adaptation. 71 He gives a special definition to this form of perfect adaptation. He calls it differential perfect adaptation, by which he means selected varieties are 'as perfect for the conditions as their hereditary structures allow'.
72 1 have two criticisms of differential perfect adaptation. First, 'perfectly adapted' here is obviously a loose oxymoron, like 'jumbo shrimp'. It is one of a repertoire of less ambiguous expressions like 'admirably adapted' that stress the power of natural selection and that simply mean well adapted. 73 Second, being well adapted by selection 'to circumstances of times' implies relative adaptation because it means surviving a competition. This is not mere retrospective reading through the lens of the Origin. In the Macculloch Abstract written about the same time as the passage above, Darwin writes: I look at every adaptation, as the surviving one of ten thousand trials.-each step being perfect to the then existing conditions.-((or nearly so . . .)> 74 Natural selection here is a process of trials, where adaptive differences are weighed. In other words adaptation is relative. The resulting form may be 'perfect', or 'nearly so', but that is only relative both to those that did not survive and to the 'then existing condition'. Relative adaptation is not made into a principle here as it is in the Origin. But it is used as an explanatory assumption. The critical point is that this statement of relative adaptation is written on the verso of the very sheet where Darwin repudiates final causes as 'barren virgins'.
It is at this point that Darwin confronts the metaphysical implications of unreformed natural theology that, even as he uses the freighted term 'perfect', he glides into the use of relative adaptation. It is from this period, in the very process of formulating natural selection, that he revisions harmony and 'secularizes' teleology by substituting the neutral anthropomorphisms of ends, functions and utility. Hereafter, he seeks to appropriate the more ambiguous talk of purpose, just as he appropriated the ambiguous term species. 75 Here, at least metaphysically, the Darwin of the Notebooks moves significantly 71 Ospovat distinguishes between two meanings of perfect adaptation: close adaptation and differential adaptation. Close adaptation is perfect in the sense that the organism is the best possible for its place in the economy of nature. Close adaptation only applies to the pre-selectionist theory. One would assume that only a providential Creator could act through close adaptation. Ospovat (op. cit. 12,1981) followed my interpretation that Darwin's 'automatic adaptation' in the pre-Malthus period meant that he accommodated Paleyan close perfect adaptation in his early transformist theory. Ospovat used this interpretation to launch his argument for the long post-selectionist perduration of perfect adaptation. However, in the light of the present paper, one has to wonder how comfortable the metaphysically alert Darwin would have been with a concept of adaptation that implied a providential Creator.
72 Ospovat op. cit. 12,1981, p. 77. 73 For example, in the 1844 Essay, Darwin saw species as 'admirably adapted (but not necessarily better adapted than every other species)' (p. 171), and 'exquisitely adapted' (p. 134), as well as 'not perfectly adapted' meaning 'only that a few other organisms can generally be found better adapted to the country than some of the aborigines' (p. 153). toward the Darwin of the Origin. He had translated teleology into a concept that was scientifically acceptable by Herschel's canons. This new teleology at the core of his scientific mechanism, unlike his old materialism, did not overtly 'tend to Atheism'. He had faced the providential demons inherent in the tradition he drew on. Here was a scientific ground for the enlightened reform of theology, or so Darwin hoped.
Ill DARWIN'S AMBIGUITY: SECRETS OF THE ORIGIN REVEALED
Knowing what we do of the powerful role that metaphysical concerns played in the early construction of Darwin's theory-knowing of his suppressed materialism and the linkage of his secularized teleology to the discovery of natural selection-Darwin's metaphysics in the Origin should now hold fewer mysteries, though they are irreducibly ambiguous. There are two hermeneutic keys. One is to assume, and then carefully define, a modicum of theological intentionality on Darwin's part. The other is to relate his Godtalk to his utilitarian treatment of adaptation. Thus, Darwin wrote to influence the direction of contemporary belief by revising the theological status of natural knowledge. In a number of ways Darwin was a theologically transitional figure. He was transitional because his reformulation of teleology played the crucial role in the conceptual secularization of the natural historical branches of biology. But in addition Darwin's theory would play a number of crucial symbolic roles in the transformations of science and religion in the nineteenth century. These transformations include: (1) the international secularization of science; (2) the crystallization of scientific naturalism as something approaching an alternative Victorian secular religion; and (3) the realignment of AngloAmerican religious politics that led to a confident, but temporary, liberal Protestant ascendancy in conflict with its increasingly defensive high and low conservative antitypes.
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The contextualizing question is: Of all the symbolic roles that Darwin played in these 'post-Darwinian' transformations, which, if any, were close to his intentions in the Origin ? I believe it was probably a firm but modest role in the latter two transformations that would most accurately reflect his intentions and mark his transitional situation. Darwin's rhetoric assumes a mixed audience of scientific and religious liberals as well as conservatives: an audience of Herschels and Sedgwicks. Often it speaks directly to a more orthodox audience than one composed of Harriet Martineaus and Tyndalls. Yet they are not excluded by its discourse, for if read at all carefully it advocates a strong form of scientific naturalism that ever after has appealed to the infidel. Perhaps, above all, Darwin's rhetoric tips the weight of scientific legitimacy and authority toward the liberal tendency in the partisan theological struggles of the day: towards an audience of Arthur Stanleys and Frederick Temples.
In short, Darwin sought to make a rigorously non-Providentialist scientific utilitarianism safe for an enlightened form of Latitudinarian theism. Ultimately, these are contradictory positions. And the ultimate source of Darwin's ambiguity in the Origin, and in his later comments, is this clear contradiction. Darwin oscillates with a well characterized indeterminacy between these antipodal contradictions. In a central and typical passage of the Origin, we can see Darwin's utilitarianism at work:
. .. how is it that varieties . . . become ultimately converted into good and distinct species . . . ? all these results . . . follow from the struggle for life. Owing to this struggle . .. any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an individual of any species . . . will tend to the preservation of that individual . . . I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection
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The key terms are 'profitable' and 'useful'. In the Darwinian view, one looks at any adaptive structure or behaviour and asks what is its utility to the individual in its 'complex relations to other organic beings and to external nature'. As is well known, but under-appreciated, this utilitarian argument rests on both capitalist and teleological metaphors. It is the old Christian defence of capitalism that Darwin secularizes and naturalizes. The primary Darwinian question is for what end, to what individual good, use, profit, purpose or function does an adaptation serve? The answer will always be couched in the life history and ecological relationships of the organism and will always be explained by natural selection.
This utilitarianism embedded in teleological language forms the persistent frame of reference in the Origin. A simple way to show this is to note the ubiquity of teleological terms. Barrett's 78 concordance of the Origin makes this a simple task. In total, Darwin uses the terms end, final cause, function, purpose, useful (in the sense of useful to species), utilitarian, and utility 105 times.
But there is teleological language and there is teleological language. There is the teleology of Paley's natural theology, which argues that each adaptation is evidence of design, and that every evidence of design is evidence of a Providential designer. There is also the secular utilitarianism of Darwin that accounts for each adaptation by its functional utility and refers the preservation of all useful functions to a natural process termed Natural Selection. Darwin's teleology lies, ironically, in the usefulness produced by a purposeless, that is to say natural, process. Natural process produces designful order without being designed, withour compelling recourse to a supernatural Designer. Hence natural process displaces the 'Designer' in the creation of nature.
There is a vast but simple difference between the Paleyan and Darwinian teleologies. It is important and historically justified to assert a genuine antithesis between Darwin and Paley and yet also to assert that their systems are both teleologies. Darwin refuses to argue from utility to Providence, and in so doing he translates into a secular discourse what Leslie Stephen called Paley's theological utilitarianism. Thus, as we have seen, in so doing he secularized biological meaning. But, it is well to remember that Paley's political economy, based on a theological utilitarianism that precedes Bentham, meshes with his natural theology. Paley's is a theo-political vision of nature and society. While Darwin secularizes its theological dimension he remains uncritically susceptible to its political He who believes that each [horse] species was independently created, will, I presume, assert that each species has been created with a tendency to vary, both under nature and under domestication . . . To admit this view is, as it seems to me, to reject a real for an unreal, or at least for an unknown, cause. It makes the works of God a mere mockery and deception. 79 The crucial point is that for Darwin special creation is the equivalent of creation by miraculous intervention of a personal God. Paley had rejected Hume's argument against miracles, and in defence of Providence had elaborated the providential teleology of the Evidences of Christianity. As has often been pointed out, Darwin was well versed in this argument from his Cambridge days. So every one of Darwin's scores of rejections and ridiculings of special creation also constitutes an intentional rejection of providential teleology.
As I have suggested, Darwin's secularization of teleology was not theologically neutral. It can be contextualized in a number of ways. To do real justice to this topic, one has to construct a map of Victorian belief on a far larger scale than this paper allows. On such a map Darwin would inhabit a border region between Victorian unbelief and liberal Anglicanism. In this region a whole range of non-'curious' secular substitutes for religion flourish in close proximity to a genuinely Christian religious culture. For one thing, much that is characteristic in Darwin can be understood as Victorian romanticism. The English romantic tradition always harboured conflicting strains of belief ranging from Wordsworth's 'lyrical materialism' 80 to Coleridge's idealist theology. Darwin can be shown to offer a theodicy of landscape 81 that responds to the seekings of Wordsworth's secularist moods. Moreover, Darwin can be shown to preach a naturalist reconciliation of the sublime and the beautiful. When he lifts up the vision of a natural world created and finely balanced by selection, he captures the heightened religious emotions of a doxology and appeals to a spirituality dislocated by the Victorian crisis.
For example, in concluding the Origin, Darwin asks his reader:
to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth . . , 82 With this visual image Darwin invites us to enter a natural landscape and to see nature as he has learned to do:
to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. But as we contemplate 'the face of nature bright with gladness' 84 displayed in the entangled bank, he reminds us of natural selection, the chief law that he has uncovered. For it is:
From the war of nature, from famine and death, that the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely the production of the higher animals directly follows. 85 Darwin ended his 'long argument' with a secular theodicy and doxology that calls on us to look around, to enter the landscape of the 'entangled bank' and to recognize that we are part of its net of relations. There is 'grandeur in this view of life', as Darwin says. The grandeur comes from the reconciliation through the lawful of the awesome, sublime struggle going on incessantly under the calm and beautiful face of nature.
But Darwin's grandeur of naturalistic vision can also be seen as a scientific expression of the romantic poetic vision. It is a vision akin to Wordsworth's reconciliation of the sublime and the beautiful. Traditionally, these aesthetic categories were seen as opposites. 86 By the sublime one understood the awe-inspiring, and in one set of associations this meant the powerful, the energetic, and even the destructive. One thinks of romantic paintings of wild mountain scenes. By the beautiful, one meant the calm and peaceful. Both these extremes traditionally functioned to induce religious feeling in the beholder of nature or of nature painting. But for Wordsworth, the poet's imagination derives from contemplating nature and seeing his emotional self reflected precisely in the balance of 'beautiful' repose and 'sublime' struggle in nature. He writes in The Prelude:
From Nature doth emotion come, and moods Of calmness equally are Nature's gift: This is her glory; these two attributes Are sister horns that constitute her strength. (Book XIII) Darwin as a young man is cut, at times, very much in the sublime romantic mode. In one sense this is the Humboldtian Darwin. But as a mature scientist-as we see him in the entangled bank imagery of the Origin-he has attained the Wordsworthian reconciliation of the sublime and the beautiful. Indeed, through that imagery, like the Wordsworth of Tintern Abbey, the mature Darwin quite literally kept alive and reinterpreted experiences of nature he had as a young naturalist during his voyage aboard the Beagle.
In 1986 I had the privilage of making a trip to Tierra del Fuego at the southernmost tip of South America, a region extensively explored by the Beagle. While there, I of course reread Darwin's journal of researches. Therein I found that the image of the entangled bank was based directly on Darwin's experience of nature in the rugged yet luxurious forests and glacier carved channels of Tierra del Fuego. The original entangled bank was the dense Southern beech forest on the bank of the Beagle Channel. Darwin says so directly in describing his first arrival in Tierra del Fuego on 17 December 1832.
A little after noon we doubled Cape St. Diego, and entered the famous strait of Le Maire. We The mountain sides (. . .) are covered from the water's edge upwards by one great forest. . . within the forest the ground is concealed by a mass of slowly putrefying vegetable matter, which, from being soaked with water, yields to the foot.
Finding it nearly hopeless to push my way through the wood, I followed the course of a mountain torrent. At first, from the waterfalls and number of dead trees, I could hardly crawl along; but the bed of the stream soon became a little more open, from the floods having swept the sides. I continued slowly to advance for an hour along the broken and rocky banks; and was amply repaid by the grandeur of the scene. The gloomy depth of the ravine well accorded with the universal signs of violence. On every side were lying irregular masses of rock and up-torn trees; other trees, though still erect, were decayed to the heart and ready to fall. The entangled mass of the thriving and the fallen reminded me of the forests within the tropics; yet there was a difference; for in these still solitudes, Death, instead of Life, seemed the predominant spirit.
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There is a quarter of a century between the wild entangled beech forest of Tierra del Fuego-depicted by Darwin with the intensity of a Caspar David Friederich paintingand the calm, beautiful entangled bank of the Origin that, nevertheless, is sustained by a sublime struggle incessantly but imperceptibly going on beneath the surface. But it is to his youthful romantic experience that Darwin turned when he came to write the secular counter-doxology of the Origin.
Yet this Victorian romanticism is only one aspect of Darwin's ideological location. Darwin's region also borders on cantons of belief that would appear on any strictly theological map of his day. First of all Darwin never directly argues against Paley. His attacks on special creation and his appropriation of utilitarianism constitute an anonymous broadside directed at his scientific contemporaries, such as Whewell, Sedgwick and even Lyell. These were Darwin's mentors, men who shared with Darwin a strong commitment to the explanation of natural phenomena by natural law. However, in the scientific-theological battles of the 1830s and 1840s, which severely strained the common context of science and religion, these men drew a line at the question of special creation. That made their position Darwin's most central target. To preserve their conjoint scientific and religious integrity, they hoped for a naturalistic explanation of special creation that would preserve the continuity of the laws of nature and preserve a personal God. The Darwin who had solved Herschel's mystery of mysteries knew that his reshaping of teleology challenged these people. These scientists are part of Darwin's theological audience.
But there are others. After the publication of the Origin, there were those, such as the Presbyterian/Congregational botanist Asa Gray, who sought to appropriate natural selection for a revived natural theology. They found themselves forestalled by the details of Darwin's utilitarianism. In the Origin, Darwin put very careful limits on the metaphysical implications of his theory. He eschews any talk of a 'plan of creation' or 'unity of design' as 'hiding our ignorance' (p. 481). He denies that 'many structures have been created for beauty in the eyes of man' as 'absolutely fatal to my theory'. He denies that natural selection can 'produce any modification in one species exclusively for the good of another species' (pp. 86-7, 200-1). Finally, and most significantly for the future advocates of theistic evolution, he denies that natural selection produces perfect adaptation:
Natural selection tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slighty more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it has to struggle for existence.... Natural selection will not produce absolute perfection, nor do we always meet... with this high standard under nature.
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As the theistic evolution movement gathered voice after 1860, this was a point that Darwin found necessary to stress through succeeding editions of the Origin. Unfortunately, historians have become accustomed to ignoring the fact that it is already conspicuous in Chapter 6 of the first edition. With these rigorous limits, as became evident in his subsequent disagreement with Asa Gray, Darwin had already severely straitened one of the few paths to Protestant reconciliation with the theory of evolution that took natural selection to be convincing science. 91 Chapter 6 makes it clear that Darwin intentionally sought to preclude a fuzzy-minded amalgam of providence and selection. So he not only cut down the old-line creationists; he also cut off the path that, notwithstanding Darwin's intentions, the new-line evolutionary reconcilers were to follow.
This move, I suggest, is the reason that the tone of Origin Chapter 6 differs so markedly from that of Chapters 3 and 4. The latter argue for the efficacy of natural selection without hint of limit. It is a hard and perfect sell. Little wonder some saw natural selection as the instrument of design and Darwin as the last of the natural theologians. Here There was, however, one quarter of theological sentiment from which Darwin might have expected understanding. That is the segment represented most prominently by the group of liberal theologians associated with Essays and Reviews. 94 It is to this Advanced Party that Darwin might have looked with hope for a limited but influential audience. There is some evidence that Darwin sought to reach out in this direction. While hundreds of British scientists signed a declaration condeming Essays and Reviews, 95 Darwin signed a kind of elite and enlightened counter 'Scientists Declaration' in the form of a letter of support to Frederick Temple, which said:
Feeling as we do that the discoveries in science, and the general progress of thought, have necessitated some modification of the views generally held on theological matters, we welcome these attempts to establish religious teaching on a firmer and broader foundation. 96 But the problem with the Advanced Party is that, at least initially, it was concerned far more with biblical criticism than with science. Before the Origin, there was no focused alignment of natural scientists akin to the Essays and Reviews group. Its most likely leader, the astronomer and philosopher John Herschel, operated from without an Oxbridge position. The leading scientist Darwin looked to for leadership, Charles Lyell, had long ago drawn his anti-transformist line in the sand, and would only cross it as a late follower not a leader. When he published the Origin, Darwin tipped for a recognizably Victorian religious position, but he stood almost alone for an Advanced Scientific Party. In the event, others such as Huxley would follow. However, their perspective was not quite Darwin's.
In sum, Darwin's ambiguity in the Origin arises from a number of sources: from the depth of his secular transformation of purpose into function; from the sincerity of his reaching out to a religious audience that might understand that this transformation did not eliminate God as the author of a lawful universe; and as we have seen from an early decision to protect himself from the public consequences of his private convictions. One may think this an unstable position. Keatsian negative capability is, after all, not for everyone. Not for Darwin's followers. Not for Darwin's critics. Not, ultimately for Darwin, as he suffered the abuse of his critics and witnessed the climate of belief altered by those who claimed to be his followers. But this was Darwin's position in the Origin.
Some may say I adopt ambiguous interpretations in this paper. Given the subject that may be inevitable, but my own purposes are not ambiguous. They are to clarify the contradictory metaphysical constituents of Darwin's theory, and to place them in the context of contemporary theo-political discourse so that we may better understand evolutionary thought as an element of modern cultural history.
